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1 Introduction
When we talk about intellectual property, it is often implicitly assumed that we are talking
about private intellectual property. However, private property and the idea of private
ownership do not exhaust the possibilities for accounts of ownership and of property. There
are other ways that ownership can operate, such as common property. A resource is common
property if its use is ‘governed by rules whose point is to make them available for use by all
or any members of the society.’1
As the economic importance of intellectual property (IP) has increased, the appropriate
direction of IP policy has received extensive attention in the law and economics literatures:
much of this debate has focused on the relative merits of open versus closed approaches to
innovation, and of commons based versus private property approaches. Common ownership
of physical resources such as fields and lakes has long been thought problematic. In Hardin’s
classic example of the tragedy of the commons, people will tend to overgraze a field which is
held in common, for it is in the interest of each shepherd to ensure that they have as many
sheep as possible, and that each of their sheep are well-grazed; however if all (or most)
shepherds behave in this way, then the commons will get overgrazed, and its ability to support
sheep will soon be destroyed.2 However the considerations which make common ownership
1 J. Waldron, ‘Property and Ownership’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2010 Edition),
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/property/>. Or, in
Lawrence Lessig’s words, ‘The essence [of the commons] is that no one exercises the core of a property right
with respect to these resources – the exclusive right to choose whether the resource is made available to
others.’ L. Lessig, The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World (New York:
Vintage, 2002), p.19.
2 See G. Hardin. ‘The tragedy of the commons,’ Science 162(3859) (1968): 1243–1248. It is worth pointing
out – as Ostrom and others have argued – that even where rival goods are held in common, the tendency
towards a tragedy of the commons is by no means inevitable; rather there are various ways of regulating the
commons which can successfully protect and sustain it. See further E. Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The
Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
2problematic in the case of real property do not apply in the case of ownership of ideas. Ideas,
unlike physical objects are nonrival: one person’s use of them does not interfere with anyone
else’s. For this reason, and for others we shall explore later, it is much more uncertain
whether and if so when private property solutions are to be preferred to common property
solutions in the case of IP.
Philosophers have so far contributed little to these debates on the optimal regulation of
ownership of IP. This chapter analyses what contribution philosophy can expect to make. I
begin in section 2 by distinguishing two tasks that philosophy can attempt when it comes to
the optimal regulation of IP: first, philosophers can devise a high level regulatory model for
IP, explaining how, for example the ontology of ideas makes a difference to how we should
regulate them, and what the overall goals are that we should have in an IP policy. Second,
philosophers can attempt to make cogent and concrete policy suggestions on the basis of such
a high level regulatory model. I argue that it is often extremely difficult to draw cogent and
concrete policy proposals from even extremely good moral and political philosophy; and
given the paucity of philosophical theorising so far about IP, it would be especially ambitious
to expect philosophers now to construct theories which will have concrete and cogent policy
implications. Hence this chapter focuses mostly on the first task.
Section 3 examines intellectual property from the perspective of moral rights.3 I argue that
one significant contribution that philosophy can make is to show that there are no moral rights
to own intellectual property; and that there are at least some cases where it is plausible to
think that private intellectual property could violate the rights of those who are excluded by it.
Section 4 sets out some of the main goals that an optimal regulatory system for IP should
encompass. I argue that there is no intrinsic value in restricting access to ideas: the sole reason
in favour of having private intellectual property restrictions in intellectual property is that
such restrictions create incentives which will speed the production of intellectually creative
work. However there are a number of important values—in particular, liberty, efficient use of
resources and equality—which will tend to conflict with intellectual property restrictions. The
net result of these value conflicts is that private ownership of intellectual property should be
thought of as a necessary evil; something that we should support only where the incentives
thus provided are necessary for the supply of future ideas, and where using such incentives is
a better way of juggling our various value commitments than other alternatives.
Section 5 examines what should follow from these claims about rights and goals for
concrete IP policies. The answer is frustratingly little, owing to the complexity of the terrain,
and the lack of data on the effectiveness of different models of incentivisation.
2 Is Philosophy Useful for Thinking About Problems of Regulation?
Philosophical thinking gains much of its power from its abstraction: philosophers typically
3 Moral rights are used here in the philosopher’s sense of rights claims which are justifiable on moral rather
than legal grounds, rather than as relating to the droit d’auteur.
3argue that they get to the heart of issues by stripping away contingent and irrelevant details,
and focusing on schematic but clearly described scenarios—scenarios which are often very
different from those we encounter in real life.
Even when we have a superb piece of moral or political philosophy which is widely
believed to make great strides in solving the schematically described problems on which it
focuses, it is often far from clear what implications the work has for what we should do, given
our current circumstances.4 To give just one example of a very general problem, Rawls makes
various abstractions and simplifications in A Theory of Justice, such as that he is concerned
with a society in which everyone is a fully contributing member over the full course of their
life; that there is no emigration or immigration; that everyone complies with the rules set out
by the theory of justice; and that the account of justice only applies to the basic structure of
society.5 In virtue of these simplifications and counter-to-fact stipulations, it is far from clear
what implications Rawls’ theory has for specific policy areas such as disability or intellectual
property. Even if we could confidently derive such a policy implication, it is unclear if it
would be a policy that we had good reason to adopt, all things considered.6
We can distinguish between two projects for philosophy in the regulation of IP: a less and
a more ambitious. The first would be to provide a systematic theoretical account of the
normative terrain, and the second to provide cogent and concrete policy recommendations on
the basis of this theoretical account. This chapter aims to undertake the first task, and to
examine the prospects for completing the second. I undertake the first task by examining IP
from the fundamental orientation of moral rights, and from the perspective of what goals
government policy should aim at when it comes to IP. However, as I shall argue in section 4,
it is not entirely clear what the implications of this theoretical account are for concrete policy
decisions: the regulatory problems are sufficiently complex, and the empirical data so
4 For two influential takes on this problem, see G. Brennan and P. Pettit, ‘The feasibility issue,” in The Oxford
Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy, ed. F. Jackson and M. Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2005), pp. 258-279; A. Sen, ‘What do we want from a theory of justice?’, Journal of Philosophy 103(5)
(2006): 215-238.
5 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Revised Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
6 Rawls himself was famously reluctant to draw specific policy conclusions from his theory of justice. In one
of the very few interviews he gave, he answered the question ‘When you look at current events, in general,
do you think of them with the A Theory of Justice framework in mind?’ as follows: “I’m sure that my view
must affect in some manner how I see them, but I don’t just ask what justice as fairness would say. That
would be limiting. I don’t see a political conception of justice as something that will tell me what to think.
It’s a great mistake to think of it as a device that will give you answers, that will deliver the answers to all
sorts of questions when you want them. That is one reason I am reluctant to answer questions about specific
political topics. It suggests the wrong idea: that we could have some theoretical way of doing that, which is
usually not so at all. I think of justice as fairness as trying to answer certain specific though basic questions.
Its scope is limited.” (S. Aybar, J. Harlan and W. Lee, ‘John Rawls: For The Record,’ Harvard Review of
Philosophy 1 (1991): 38-48, at p.45. Online at http://www.hcs.harvard.edu/~hrp/issues/1991/Rawls.pdf)
4unreliable that it is unclear how best to pursue our values. In part this is only to be expected:
doing good applied philosophical work has proved difficult, even in areas such as bioethics,
where a large amount of applied work has been done over a long period of time.7
3 Private Intellectual Property And Moral Rights
One key contribution that philosophers can make to thinking about regulation is the simple
distinction between rights and goals. If each citizen has a right to a particular resource or
freedom, then the duty holder of the right must secure that particular freedom or resource for
each individual to whom the right applies. Rights are highly resistant to aggregation: the fact
that many people have their rights fulfilled does nothing to reduce the claims of those who do
not. Goals give governments general directions for policy, but they do not require a
government to guarantee to each individual any particular freedom or resource. So long as a
government is pursuing a goal diligently and fairly, no citizen has a legitimate individualised
complaint about not being supplied with the good at which the policy aims.8
Rights in the sense I am using them are moral rather than legal rights: legal rights are those
rights that exist under a given legal system, whilst moral rights are those rights that morality
requires us to recognise.9 We are interested in this section in whether there is a moral right to
own intellectual property (clearly there is a legal right to hold a copyright on a book, or to
hold a patent); and we are also interested in whether legal rights to own intellectual property
7 I provide an analysis of why policy oriented bioethics is so difficult in J. Wilson, ‘Towards a Normative
Framework for Public Health Ethics and Policy,’ Public Health Ethics 2(2) (2009): 184–194. There I argue
that philosophers and bioethicists have tended to underestimate the complexity of social systems, and the
difficulties involved in reforming them. Once we understand this, then we see that the problems involved in
reforming complex institutions are orders of magnitude more complex than is implied or presupposed by
simplistic attempts to go from, for example, Mill’s harm principle plus a few facts to a claim about how we
should regulate a new technology.
8 For this way of drawing the distinction between rights and goals, see for example, T. M. Scanlon, ‘Rights,
goals, and fairness,’ Erkenntnis 11(1) (1977): 81–95. I write more on the concept of rights in J. Wilson,
‘Rights’, in Principles of Healthcare Ethics, ed. R. Ashcroft, A. Dawson, H. Draper and J. McMillan
(London: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 2007).
9 In the context of IP, the term ‘moral rights’ is potentially ambiguous, as it is also used for legal rights which
accrue particularly to authors, such as the right of attribution and the right not to have one’s work
bowdlerised. In this chapter I shall reserve the term ‘moral rights’ solely for rights with a moral as opposed to
a legal justification.
5might violate moral rights such as the right to healthcare or the right to life.10
Making this distinction between rights and goals does not yet commit us to the claim that
there are any rights. Rather, it points up how two different types of consideration can play
different roles in the justification of public policy. Some kinds of reasons act as exclusionary:
even if a goal were otherwise worth pursuing, it would be wrong to pursue the goal if it
involved violating a consideration which was highly resistant to aggregation. Obviously,
given this conception of rights, we should start by ensuring that—in whatever policy we
adopt—we are not violating anyone’s rights. We should select our policies only from the set
of those ways of regulating that do not violate rights.
There are four different permutations with regard to the rights of those who create
intellectual property, and those who make would use it. (I shall use ‘the inventor’ to refer to
the person who creates a piece of IP, and ‘the user’ to refer to the person who wants to make
use of it).
Rights in intellectual property policy
1. Both have moral rights.
The inventor has a moral right to own IP,
and the user also has some moral right or
moral rights that would be infringed if we
allow extensive private ownership of
intellectual property.
2. Only inventor has a moral right.
The inventor has a moral right to own
intellectual property, and the user does not
have any moral rights that would be
infringed if we allow extensive private
ownership of intellectual property.
3. Only users have moral rights.
The inventor does not have a moral right to
own IP, and the user has some moral right or
moral rights that would be infringed if we
allow extensive private ownership of
intellectual property.
4. Neither users nor inventors have moral
rights.
The inventor does not have a moral right to
own intellectual property, and the user does
not have any moral rights that would be
infringed if we allow extensive private
10 As I shall be using the concept of moral rights, moral rights commit us to the claim that moral rights enjoy
some sort of (possibly defeasible) priority over non rights based claims. Of course this is not the only way we
can coherently think about rights. Whilst this ‘rights as trumps’ view can be disputed in as much as many of
the legal rights we do recognise are not particularly morally weighty, I shall not enter into the murky waters
of the conceptual analysis of rights here. This is because the basic normative claims could be made without
reference to rights: those who are worried by the idea of rights as trumps should be able to replace references
to rights without loss with the phrase morally important claims of individuals which ground at least
reasonably stringent duties to those individuals. I use the term rights simply because it is rather less unwieldy
than this construction.
6ownership of intellectual property.
If case (1) obtained, we would have to think through IP policy through the lens of the
philosophical discussion of conflicts of rights.11 If case (2) obtained, we would expect the
inventor’s right based claims to take precedence over the claims made by the users of the IP:
the inventor’s claims would be claims of rights, whilst those of the users would be of
something less than rights. If case (3) correctly described the situation with regard to IP, then
we should expect users’ needs to constrain what would otherwise be reasonable systems of
incentives. If case (4) correctly described the situation with regard to IP, then we should see
IP policy as a way of trying to reach towards certain yet to be specified socially valuable
goals, without having to negotiate major side constraints.
I argue that neither of the first two options correctly describe the normative situation,
because there cannot be any intrinsic moral rights to own intellectual property. Hence the
normative situation we face is either one where no one has any relevant rights, or one where
only users do. I shall then argue that it is possible for private ownership of intellectual
property to wrong people. The upshot is that case (3) describes the normative situation: whilst
private ownership of intellectual property is never required in order to respect moral rights,
stringent private intellectual property regimes may wrong people, if they prevent them from
getting access to goods that they have a right to.
3.1 Ruling out options (1) and (2): there cannot be a moral right to own
intellectual property
It is sometimes argued that, just as labouring on unowned physical property can give the
labourer a moral right to own the object laboured on, so labouring on ideas which were
previously part of the intellectual commons can give rise to a moral right to own the resulting
ideas.12 For instance, it might be thought that in writing a novel, someone transforms elements
which are part of the stock of the intellectual commons—such as archetypal plots and
characters—and in transforming these materials creates something new which she has a moral
11 See for example J. J. Thomson, The realm of rights (Cambridge: Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992); F.
M. Kamm, Intricate Ethics: Rights, Responsibilities, and Permissible Harm (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2007), chapter 9.
12 By the intellectual commons, I mean the set of all the ideas, theories and mental constructs which are open to
all to use. The intellectual commons excludes all ideas which are subject to private intellectual property. It
includes any ideas which are (a) currently deemed inadmissible for intellectual property protection (such as
mathematical algorithms, scientific theories, natural languages); (b) those ideas which are potentially
admissible for intellectual property protection, but which have not yet been claimed as private property; and
(c) ideas which were subject to intellectual property protection but which no longer are because the
maximum term of intellectual property protection for them has expired (such as Dickens’ novels).
7right to exclude others from. If this thought were correct, then it would be wrongful to treat
such a work as part of the commons without the author’s permission: doing so would breach
her rights.
I have argued at length elsewhere that arguments of this kind for moral rights to own
intellectual property are unconvincing; and that there cannot be any pre-legislative moral
entitlements to own intellectual property.13 The essence of this argument is that we cannot
simply multiply moral rights ad infinitum: we cannot claim that there is a moral right to X
without providing a moral explanation or justification of why we should recognise such a
right. All attempts to justify moral rights must be subjected to what I call the Rights
Justification Principle.
Any justification of an intrinsic moral right must show that violating the right
would typically result in either a wrongful harm or other significant wrong to the
holder of the right, which is independent of the existence of the moral right we are
trying to justify.
The problem for any putative moral right to own intellectual property is that we do not
seem to be able to explain how the inventor would be wrongfully harmed or otherwise
wronged by unauthorised copying of her work unless we already presuppose the existence of
the very right we are trying to justify. For there are only three plausible ways in which
someone might be wronged by the unauthorised copying of her published work in a way that
meets the criterion set down by the Rights Justification Principle:
1. The creator is wronged by being excluded from the use of what she has created.
2. The creator is wronged by being prevented from excluding others from what she has
created.
3. The creator is wronged by others benefiting unfairly from her creative effort.
However, none of these putative justifications could plausibly ground a right to own
intellectual property, for the following reasons.
(1) is unconvincing because usage of a nonrival good cannot deplete it or stop anyone else
from using it. And so a fortiori unauthorised use of a nonrival good cannot prevent the author
from using it. Therefore, merely making unauthorised use of the work cannot prevent her
from using the work, and thus cannot be the basis for a claim that the inventor’s intrinsic
moral rights have been violated.
(2) is unconvincing because being prevented from making money by excluding others from
access to one’s work does not constitute a wrongful harm or other significant wrong which is
independent of the (putative) intrinsic moral right to exclude others from access to one’s
work. It is only if we presuppose the right whose existence we are trying to justify that it
13 See J. Wilson, ‘Could There be a Right to Own Intellectual Property?’ Law and Philosophy 28(4) (2009):
393–427; J. Wilson, ‘Ontology and the Regulation of Intellectual Property’, The Monist 93 (2010): 450-463.
8seems plausible to claim that being prevented from charging others for access to one’s
creation is a wrong to the inventor.
(3) is unconvincing because—assuming there are no pre-existing agreements in place—
benefiting from another’s effort is unfair only where so benefiting imposes a cost on the
person providing the benefit. Making use of an inventor’s idea does not impose a cost on her,
and so is not unfair.
I conclude that none of 1-3 provide any justification for thinking that there is an intrinsic
right to own intellectual property. Nor are there any other plausible wrongful harms or other
wrongs caused merely by unauthorised copying which are independent of the existence of the
(putative) intrinsic moral right to exclude others from copying and use of one’s creations.14 It
follows that the legal right to make money by excluding others from access to one’s work
cannot be an intrinsic moral right. As Jefferson put it, ‘Inventions then cannot, in nature, be a
subject of property. Society may give an exclusive right to the profits arising from them, as an
encouragement to men to pursue ideas which may produce utility, but this may or may not be
done, according to the will and convenience of the society, without claim or complaint from
anybody.’15
3.2 The ‘No Hardship’ Argument
It is sometimes argued that it is impossible to wrong anyone by asserting private ownership of
ideas which would not have existed but for the inventor. On this view, where someone has
created something new out of goods which were part of the intellectual commons (say by
writing a novel, or creating a new drug), no one can claim to be wronged if the person keeps
the new idea private and charges money for access to it. The basic thought is that in so doing
the author leaves those excluded no worse off than they would otherwise have been, and so
cannot wrong them. As Mill puts it, ‘It is no hardship to any one, to be excluded from what
others have produced: they were not bound to produce it for his use, and he loses nothing by
not sharing in what otherwise would not have existed at all.’16 Call this, following Waldron,
the no hardship argument.17 I shall argue (in agreement with Waldron) that this argument is
not sound.
14 I allow that there may be reasons stemming from the importance of privacy to allow authors to prevent the
publication of works that they do not want released to public scrutiny. But once an author has made a work
public, she does not have a moral right to exclude others from the use of this idea.
15 T. Jefferson, Letter to Isaac McPherson (13 August 1813), in The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, ed. A. E.
Bergh (Washington D.C.: The Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association of the United States, 1907), vol. 13,
pp. 333-35. Also available at http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/toc/modeng/public/JefLett.html.
16 J. S. Mill, Principles of political economy: with some of their applications to social philosophy, (5th ed..
London: Parker, Son, and Bourn, 1862), II.2.26.
17 J. Waldron, ‘From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights and Social Values in Intellectual Property’,
Chicago-Kent Law Review 68 (1993): 841–887, at pp. 862-868.
9The no hardship argument makes the assumption that if someone is left no worse off than
she would otherwise have been, she cannot have been wronged. However it does appear to be
possible to wrong someone even if one does not leave her worse off than she would otherwise
be. Suppose that Jill is drowning, in an isolated location. Fred notices her as he’s zooming
past in his speedboat. He does not turn around, reasoning that as she’s no worse off than she
would have been if he hadn’t stopped, he can’t have wronged her. This seems monstrous. It is
an open question whether we should say that Fred harms Jill in this circumstance; but it seems
overwhelmingly plausible to say that he wrongs her. So he either wrongs her without harming
her, or wrongfully harms her despite the fact that she ends up no worse off than she would
have been had he not been passing.18
When a drug comes onto the market which provides the only treatment for a painful and
debilitating condition, and the company which holds the patent on the drug uses its monopoly
power to charge very high prices and thereby excludes nearly everyone in developing
countries from getting access to the drug, the situation may be relevantly similar to the
speedboat case. We might think that if there is a moral right to access essential medicines,
then the fact that someone would be no worse off than if the company had not invented the
drug, is not enough to show that he is not wronged.
Whilst it seems plausible to say that intellectual property restrictions can violate rights, it is
much less plausible to think that any and every restriction will do so: if the good which is
protected by intellectual property rights does not serve a serious need (like a new type of
coffee grinder), or if an existing item in the intellectual commons could perform substantially
the same task, then the case for rights violation is weak.19 It is only where the good from
which the person will be excluded is of substantial importance, and where the good cannot be
substituted for one from the commons that it seems plausible to think that IP regulation will
violate rights.
18 The concept of harm is surprisingly slippery. Intuitively, A harms B if A makes B worse off than B would
otherwise have been. But it is difficult to spell out what the standard is against which we should judge ‘would
otherwise have been’. There seem to be two basic kinds of answer: either we specify it in terms of a non-
normative baseline, or we specify it in terms of a normative baseline. Both can cause problems, and it is far
from clear that a single baseline (whether normative or non-normative) can capture all of our intuitive
judgements about when one person harms another. For further discussion, see Wilson, ‘Could There be a
Right to Own Intellectual Property?’; J. Feinberg. Harmless Wrongdoing (The Moral Limits of the Criminal
Law) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). S. Wilkinson, Bodies for Sale: Ethics and Exploitation in the
Human Body Trade (London: Routledge, 2003), pp. 56-71.
19 For example, many new drugs are ‘me-too’ drugs are designed to be substantially similar to existing drugs in
action and effect. If the patent has lapsed on the original drug, it seems much less plausible to say that
anyone’s rights are violated if they are priced out of gaining access to the me-too drug.
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4 The appropriate goals of intellectual property regulation
Restricting access to ideas which it would be legitimate for people to know is not good in
itself.20 Where it is pursued, it must be for the sake of some other goal.21 The standard
answer—and in fact the only answer with any currency, once we rule out intrinsic moral
rights to own IP—is that the goal of IP regulation is to promote the beneficial effects of
human creativity.
I understand the ‘beneficial effects of human creativity’ in a broad sense, to include both
the beneficial effects for consumers of having more products on the market that will meet
their needs and preferences, and the beneficial effects for current and future creators who will
be able to draw on the results of more human creativity.22 Human creativity in this broad
sense encompasses new scientific ideas, new inventions, new films, computer programs, plant
varieties and so on.
Human creativity is clearly extremely important for the future of human society: it is
through such creativity that we have raised living standards over time; and it will be through
such human creativity that we will attempt to improve our living conditions in the future.
Whilst human creativity has also had substantial negative effects, I shall leave these on one
side here. My interest is in a different question: how can attempts to incentivise creativity
impact negatively on other goals that societies should have; and when they do, which should
20 There are some bodies of knowledge (for example about how to make dirty bombs) whose wide circulation it
would probably be beneficial to prevent. But these bodies of knowledge would in any case be problematic to
publish, whether or not someone had IP rights on the work published. The morality clause of the European
Patent Convention, namely that ‘inventions the commercial exploitation of which would be contrary to
“ordre public” or morality’ are excluded from patentability (Article 53a), displays the impotence of IP law
here. This clause is not a very effective way of regulating genuinely immoral activity, as refusing a patent is
not sufficient to make an activity illegal: if cloning human beings was legal, but we refused to grant patents
on such processes, people would still be free to clone human beings. The only thing we would be denying
them by denying patentability would be the right to exclude others from so doing.
21 As Penner puts it, ‘The right to property is grounded by the interest we have in using things in the broader
sense. No one has any interest in merely excluding others from things, for any reason or no reason at all.’
James Penner. The Idea of Property in Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p.70.
22 IP regulation may not so obviously benefit future producers. But this is part of its rationale: patents, for
instance, require the patentor to publish a description of how the invention works. The granting of the
temporary monopoly is the quid pro quo for making this knowledge public. If there were no patents, then
inventors would have a much greater recourse to trade secrets. Trade secrecy has the drawback that people
continually have to duplicate effort, as they attempt to solve problems that have already been solved. In the
past there have been some quite significant cases of the withholding of information which could have saved
lives: for example, the Chamberlen family kept the discovery of the obstetrics forceps secret for more than
100 years, in order to protect their midwifery business. See W. Moore, ‘Keeping mum’, BMJ 334(7595)
(2007): 698–a.
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take precedence? If the benefits of human creativity are more equivocal than might at first be
thought, this would strengthen rather than undermine the reasons for being cautious about
incentives to creativity which undermine other important goods. So, for the purposes of my
argument I shall grant the claim that human creativity is an important force for good, which
there are pro tanto reasons to encourage.
There are a number of important goals which can be threatened by restricting access to
human creativity. I shall consider three: liberty, making best use of resources, and equality.
Liberty. Ideas are by nature nonexcludable.23 If we wish to prevent sharing of ideas, we need
to take positive steps, such as erecting digital fences like Digital Rights Management (DRM),
or legislating to allow for private ownership of intellectual property. Such steps involve
impositions on liberty: they prevent people from being able to do things that they were
previously able to do. Such incursions into liberty are problematic for two reasons: first if we
think that liberty is a good thing, then reductions of liberty are prima facie bad. Second, it
requires us to use the coercive force of the law to criminalise activities which are not wrong in
themselves. So whilst liberty is by no means so important that it trumps all considerations,24
incursions into liberty do have to be justified: we need to be able to show that allowing people
the liberty to perform the proscribed action will be bad in some way.
Making best use of resources. Ideas are by their nature nonrival in consumption. If one person
has a good idea everyone can benefit from that idea and build on it, without the original idea
being destroyed or degraded.25 If we allow someone a monopoly on the supply of a nonrival
good, the monopoly holder is able to extract an economic rent from those who buy the
product. In a competitive market, prices are kept down by competition: companies will seek
to differentiate themselves in the market by offering goods either at a higher quality, or a
lower price, with the net result that (in an efficient market) profit margins are low. Where we
have a monopoly, there is no reason to think that the price charged for a good will bear any
relationship to the marginal cost of production. Governments in general have an obligation to
make the best use of their resources, and to prevent monopolies from occurring; both
23 As Jefferson put it, waxing poetical, ‘That ideas should freely spread from one to another over the globe, for
the moral and mutual instruction of man, and improvement of his condition, seems to have been peculiarly
and benevolently designed by nature, when she made them, like fire, expansible over all space, without
lessening their density in any point, and like the air in which we breathe, move, and have our physical being,
incapable of confinement or exclusive appropriation.’ (‘Letter to Isaac McPherson’)
24 I have written about this in the context of health: J. Wilson and A. Dawson, ‘Giving liberty its due, but no
more: trans fats, liberty, and public health,’ The American Journal of Bioethics 10(3) (2010): 34–36.
25 As we noted earlier, this is quite unlike a commons such as a village green, or fishing the sea. In the cases of
these exhaustible commons, there is reason to restrict access, or to have some kind of governance norms to
ensure that the resource is not overused.
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obligations are challenged by allowing private ownership of IP. 26
Equality. Nonrival goods are not capable of scarcity, and are hence capable of being supplied
to everyone who desires them. If there is a scarcity in the supply of a given nonrival good, it
is because we have elected to create an artificial scarcity. This is different from the case of
rival goods where we frequently see ‘natural’ scarcities. Because of this, ideas as goods have
a particular resonance from the perspective of equality. A society of equals is one in which
each citizen can look each other in the eye, and think of herself as of equal status to each other
person. The goal of a society of equals is undermined where there are goods which have a
large effect on the way which social status is negotiated, and which are differentially spread
(particularly when this reinforces existing patterns of advantage and disadvantage).
Conversely such a society is promoted where there are goods and freedoms which are
important for social status which are available to each on conditions of equality. Because
ideas matter for human life, and because ideas can be made available to all at only a marginal
extra cost, the goal of a society of equals will push us towards open access to ideas.
So in sum, approaching IP regulation from a abstract philosophical perspective should lead
us to affirm the following claims:
1. There are no moral rights to privately own intellectual property. We can either grant or
not grant such legal rights without wronging inventors.
2. Granting private intellectual property rights may sometimes violate other rights such as
the right to life.
3. Denying access to ideas is not good in itself. Denying access to ideas is good only when
it serves some further purpose: namely promoting the beneficial effects of human
creativity.
4. Restricting access to ideas is in tension with other important goals such as protection of
liberty, making the best use of our resources, and equality.
5. Therefore, private intellectual property, where we adopt it as a way of incentivising
creativity, should be viewed as a necessary evil.27
26 The European Regulation on Orphan Medicinal Products provide a good example of this. (Regulation (EC)
No 141/2000.) When BioMarin was awarded a European orphan licence for amifampridine (Firdapse), ‘a
slightly modified version of 3,4-diaminopyridine, which is unlicensed but has been used for more than 20
years to treat two rare diseases, Lambert Eaton myasthenic syndrome (LEMS) and congenital myasthenic
syndrome,’ price rises were enormous. Treatment for a patient with diaminopyridine cost £800-£1000 per
year, but BioMarin charged £40,000-£70,000 for amifampridine. N. Hawkes and D. Cohen. ‘What makes an
orphan drug?’ BMJ 341 (2010): c6459–c6459.
27 The position is not so dissimilar from that put forward by Macaulay a while ago: “Thus, then, stands the case.
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The next question is what implications these thoughts should have for concrete IP policy
decisions.
5 Balancing rights and goals in intellectual property regulation
Going from the more abstract theories to concrete and workable policy proposals is something
that is difficult even in those fields of applied philosophy such as bioethics where most work
has been done. So what I shall be doing in this section will be quite programmatic, and will
also be relatively cautious about what the implications of the analysis so far should be for
public policy.
We can separate two questions to which we would need to know the answer before we
could make helpful IP policy recommendations: an empirical question and a normative one.
The empirical question is: what kinds of environments and regulatory regimes foster
creativity most effectively? The normative question is: how are the goods of creativity to be
weighed against other goods such as liberty and equality? I shall discuss each in turn.
5.1 Prospects for answering the empirical question
When we test the safety and efficacy of a new drug, we control the clinical trial through
procedures such as random assignment of participants to the different trial arms, double
blinding (so that neither the trial participants nor the researchers know who is receiving which
treatment), power calculations (estimating how large a sample size is required to show a
statistically significant effect) and placebo controls. A well designed clinical trial thus gives
us a high degree of confidence that perceived differences in effects between the two trial arms
are caused by differences between the interventions trialled and not some other factor.
It is impossible to perform similarly rigorous tests of the effectiveness of different options
for the regulation of intellectual property—to consider say the effects of 20 year patent terms
against 25 years. First, it would not be feasible to run a randomised trial which allocated some
inventors to longer or to shorter patent terms. Those who were randomised to the shorter
patent life would inevitably argue that they were not being treated equally under the law.
Even leaving this on one side, such a trial would lack a large number of the other features
which allow us to control clinical trials.
The closest we can get to a rigorous empirical test is a natural experiment: we can
It is good that authors should be remunerated; and the least exceptionable way of remunerating them is by a
monopoly. Yet monopoly is an evil. For the sake of the good we must submit to the evil; but the evil ought
not to last a day longer than is necessary for the purpose of securing the good.” Thomas Babington
Macaulay, speech delivered in the House of Commons (February 5, 1841), in The Life and Works of Lord
Macaulay: Complete in Ten Volumes, Edinburgh ed. (Longmans, 1897), vol. VIII, p. 198.
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investigate past changes in IP regulation, and then see the effects that followed in their wake.
However such experiments are so uncontrolled that it is difficult to draw reliable conclusions
from them. It is clear that we would not be able to attribute all of any changes of rates of
innovation to changes in the regulation of private intellectual property, given that there are
many factors which affect how much people are willing to invest in research and development
such as tax breaks, the overall state of the economy, what they think their competitors are
likely to be doing and how copyable products are without intellectual property protection.
How much of any improvements in innovation rates are caused by the change in IP legislation
will be deeply contestable. There will be two further deep problems we would need to solve
before taking such natural experiments seriously: first there is the problem of measuring
creativity. Should we adopt an objective metric such as numbers of patents filed, or number of
films released; or should we also focus on the quality of innovations? Second, even if we
were to know that, an intervention such as extending the length of the patent term from 20
years to 25 years had a beneficial effect on creativity in one country, it would not follow from
this that increasing the length of the patent term would have similarly beneficial effects for
our society now. Public policy does not work in such a straightforward and linear way.28
What all this means is that what empirical evidence we do have of the effects of different
systems of IP regulation lacks rigour—and is certainly not the kind of evidence on the basis of
which anyone should feel comfortable about making wide ranging choices about the future of
societies. We also have economic models of how creativity is best incentivised. Obviously,
for the reasons we have just mentioned, it is extremely difficult to test these models
empirically, and perhaps unsurprisingly, these economic models have have wildly different
implications, depending on the value orientations of their proponents. Burk and Lemley
identify five main economic models in the literature on patents: prospect theory, competitive
innovation, cumulative innovation, the anticommons, and patent thickets. Each of these
incorporates different assumptions about the kinds of infrastructure and incentives system
needed for optimal innovation. Prospect theory assumes that patents should operate like
prospects in mining: having IP rights gives companies an incentive to invest more in research
and development in the area of their patent in order to reap the benefits of this. This way of
looking at innovation implies that “only strong rights to preclude competition will effectively
encourage innovation”, and that hence ‘patents should be granted early in the invention
process, and should have broad scope and few exceptions’.29 Competitive innovation theory
argues that innovation comes mostly from competition between firms, and that because of this
we should ensure that ‘patent rights should be narrow and should give less than perfect
monopoly control.’30 Cumulative innovation theorists argue that most useful creativity is
28 On the relevant disanalogies between the clinical trial context and the public policy context, see Trisha
Greenhalgh and Jill Russell. ‘Evidence-Based Policymaking: A Critique’, Perspectives in Biology and
Medicine 52(2) (2009): 304–318.
29 Dan L. Burk and Mark A. Lemley. ‘Policy Levers in Patent Law’, Virginia Law Review 89(7) (2003): 1575–
1696 at p.1604.
30 Burk and Lemley, ‘Policy Levers in Patent Law’, p.1607
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additive to already existing inventions, and so that we need to ensure that we do not have a
winner-takes-all approach such as the prospect theory approach incorporates, but rather one
that allows people to make incremental improvements to products that others have produced.
Anticommons theorists focus on the transaction costs involved in licensing multiple patents,
and use this as a way of arguing that fundamental innovation platforms should be available
freely for innovation.31 Theorists of patent thickets focus on the problems of overlapping
patent claims, and argue that patent claims should be narrower, or the nonobviousness
requirement should be made more stringent.32
There is no reason to think that one of these models will be optimal for the incentivisation
of all inventions. Variables which are relevant to the shape of optimal systems of
incentivisation include the cost of bringing a new product to market; the cost of copying
versus the cost of invention; and the extent of first mover advantage in a particular market.
These costs will vary systematically between industries, and it may well be that an industry
such as pharmaceuticals (where it is extremely costly to bring a drug to market, and relatively
cheap to copy), would have an optimal system of incentivisation significantly different from
that of saucepans.
One apparent solution to this might be to have a more highly differentiated system of
intellectual property protection: tailoring the incentives provided to what is required for best
innovation in each particular industry. However there are also problems in having highly
differentiated systems of incentivisation: we will face problems of categorisation (with
incentives to game the system); and challenges from emerging technologies (do we need to be
continually inventing new schemes of incentivisation?) Finally, we should not forget that
each new amendment to the patent statute represents an opportunity for
counterproductive special interest lobbying… Patent law has some balance today
in part because different industries have different interests, making it difficult for
one interest group to push through changes to the statute. Industry-specific
legislation is much more vulnerable to industry capture.33
So it is also unclear that providing a highly differentiated system of patents would be a net
gain.
31 For more on anticomons approaches, see M. A. Heller and R. S. Eisenberg. ‘Can Patents Deter Innovation?
The Anticommons in Biomedical Research’, Science 280(5364) (1998): 698 –701; M. A. Heller. ‘The
Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets’, Harvard Law Review
111(3) (1998): 621–688.
32 For patent thicket approaches, see C. Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools,
and Standard Setting’, Innovation Policy and the Economy 1 (2000): 119–150.
33 Burk and Lemley, ‘Policy Levers in Patent Law’, p.1637
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5.2 Prospects of answering the normative question
The normative question is how we should weigh the goods of human creativity against other
goods such as liberty and equality. Clearly, IP regulation must respect moral rights. We have
seen how patents on essential pharmaceuticals might violate moral rights in some cases. To
the extent that we are dealing with moral rights, the link between abstract theorising and
policy is clear. However, we earlier argued that not much of intellectual property policy will
in fact come down to judgements about when moral rights are violated. The great majority of
policy decisions will come down to decisions about how to rank different potential policies, in
the light of the different values embodied by each policy.
We can approach the task of ranking different policies in the light of the values embodied
by each policy in a more or a less ambitious way. On the more ambitious approach, we would
attempt to work out a once and for all ranking of all the values in play, and then use this to
deduce the answer in the particular case. On the less ambitious approach, we find a way of
ranking these values in the particular situation we face, even if that does not amount to a
solution for all cases.
It is far from clear that the more ambitious approach is possible: in order for it to be
possible, what Henry Richardson calls strong deliberative commensurability would have to be
the case: there would have to be ‘some single norm (or good) such that all the considerations
for and against any option in any situation may be adequately arrayed prior to the choice (for
purposes of deliberation) simply in terms of the greater or lesser satisfaction of that norm (or
instantiation of that good).’34 Strong commensurability is difficult to combine with value
pluralism: if the ways in which equality and liberty are valuable are different from the way
that human creativity is valuable, then it is difficult to see how strong commensurability could
be true.
The implausibility of strong deliberative commensurability does not entail that it is
impossible for philosophers (or anyone else) to make correct judgments about individual
policies which involve tradeoffs between different goods. It follows only that there cannot be
a single standard in virtue of which we do this. It is unclear that making tradeoffs between
competing values in particular contexts and given other constraints is something in which
philosophers qua philosophers have particular expertise. Rather, I think we do better to
consider these to be fit subjects for deliberative democracy: decidable on the basis of rigorous
arguments by all in the community; not just those with specialist philosophical knowledge.
6 Conclusion
Private ownership of IP is not required by respect for moral rights. But given the public goods
problem in the production of new ideas, it is plausible to think that suboptimal amounts of
34 H. Richardson, Practical Reasoning about Final Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994),
p.104.
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innovation will occur unless incentives are provided. Adopting private property approaches to
incentivising production of ideas is in a certain amount of tension with the values of liberty,
making best use of resources, and equality; and so if it were possible to get similar amounts of
innovation with a common ownership approach to a private ownership approach, there would
be reason to prefer the common ownership approach. It is less clear what the policy
implications of these normative claims should be, given the paucity and the unreliability of
the evidence we have on the effects of different regulatory regimes.
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